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This essay starts by outlining what the author considers to be the three general properties of the 
phenomenological approach. This approach is then taken to the question of what an academic 
discipline is and how one becomes a member of a discipline, with some positive and negative 
aspects that can develop considered. Demonstrating how phenomenological questions can be 
asked and answered, this approach invites attempts to confirm, correct and extend the account 






This essay has two parts. In the first I describe what I 
consider to be the three general properties of the 
phenomenological approach, and in the second I take 
this approach to the question of what an academic 
discipline is and how one becomes a member of a 
discipline, with some positive and negative aspects 
that can develop then considered. In the process, what 
is presented serves as a demonstration of how 
phenomenological questions can be asked and 
answered. And this approach invites attempts to 
confirm, correct and extend the account through more 




Phenomenology is usually encountered with 
disciplinary specification and, although there is 
phenomenology in some three dozen other 
disciplines, this specification is still often that of the 
discipline of philosophy, so that probably most 
colleagues simply understand phenomenology to be a 
type of philosophy, a philosophical school of thought. 
Given the phenomenological tendencies in many 
other disciplines, however, it would seem proper 
always to express the entire specification, and thus to 
speak specifically of “philosophical phenomenology”, 
“communicological phenomenology”, “sociological 
phenomenology”, “psychological phenomenology”, 
and so forth. Alternatively, if one’s concern is more 
specifically with the proliferation of schools of 
thought within disciplines, one can speak of 
“phenomenological philosophy”, “phenomenological 
sociology”, and so on.  
 
To grasp the genus of the phenomenological 
approach, one needs to abstract from whatever 
disciplinary specification one begins from. Having 
pondered this matter awhile, I have come to believe 
that “generic phenomenology”, as it may then be 
called, has three properties, so that it can be said to be 
reflective, descriptive and culture appreciative. I will 
now take these properties up in this order. 
 
(1) In being reflective, phenomenology is conducted 
in a theoretical attitude in which one is no longer – as 
is usual – unreflective or straightforward and thus 
oblivious of how things are given, appear, and are 
believed in, valued, and willed, and in which one also 
does one not thematize one’s own mental life, 
although the mental lives of Others are regularly 
encountered. When one then reflects, however, one 
can observe oneself as an I with attitudes including 
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the reflective and straightforward attitudes, one can 
observe components within how one encounters 
things (taking “things” so broadly that anything is a 
“thing”), and one can observe how there are various 
types of experiencing and, in broad significations, 
various modes of believing, valuing and willing, as 
well as, correlatively, in things-as-encountered, 
specifically things-as-experienced, as-believed-in, as-
valued and as-willed in manifold ways. And what I 
have just said amounts to an initial reflective analysis 
and description. 
 
Most accounts of reflection fail to recognize that it 
takes two major forms. What has been sketched in the 
previous paragraph can be said to be based on the 
type of reflection best called “self-observation”. But 
there can also be “reflection on others”. Sitting on a 
bench in the park, I can encounter another person 
seated on a bench across the walk from me whom I 
notice watching a frisky puppy being walked on a 
leash between us.  In this case I can focus on how this 
Other is not only perceiving in a predominantly visual 
way, but also note how she is at least mildly enjoying 
the sight, as well as that she perceives the dog through 
the side opposite that through which I perceive the 
dog. Already I somehow have access to the mental 
life of the other and her predominantly visual and 
affective encountering, and to the thing encountered 
by her as-encountered. In saying “predominantly” I 
intend that auditory and tactual as well as volitional 
and belief aspects are subordinate or latent in what I 
reflectively observe in this Other. 
 
Then, again, this Other across the walk might have a 
friend seated with her Other, and her comment, or 
perhaps her noticed amused watching, motivates her 
friend to watch the playful puppy too. In this slightly 
more complex case, I can reflect on a minimal group 
to which the two Others belong. Similarly, I might 
also be with a friend, and we form a We opposite the 
You of two and are thereby able to engage in a more 
complicated collective self-observation as well as a 
more complicated collective reflection on Others. If 
all four of us notice what we are enjoying and how, 
then there is a reflectively observable group of four 
that may be articulated into two groups of two. And 
for all of these humans there is one thing reflectively 
observable as-encountered in four slightly different 
ways. Phenomenology is thus more than individual 
self-observation and description. 
 
(2) On the basis of reflection and analysis, one can 
produce descriptions. Usually because we have 
practical purposes, we often engage in explanation 
hastily, with trying to say why something happens, 
for that can be a basis for affecting outcomes through 
manipulating causal circumstances. But one needs to 
know what things are before one can specify the 
circumstances under which they arise, change, or are 
eliminated. Descriptions are of what things are. They 
can be of particular things, such as “The cow is in the 
barn”, but they can also be in universal or eidetic 
terms, for instance “Cows are mammals”. We seem to 
describe in universal terms more than we do in 
particular terms. Some thinkers contrast inter-
pretation, which strictly speaking relates to linguistic 
expressions, with description, but both have in 
common the determination of what things are before 
relating to other things, their causes and effects first 
of all. The question of what best comes before the 
question of why. 
 
Being descriptive is also opposed to being 
argumentative. Phenomenologists do sometimes offer 
arguments, just as they do sometimes offer 
explanations, but these are not predominant in the 
accounting for things in the reflective-analytic 
approach. What is typical in phenomenology is 
instead the procedure of beginning from something 
that is somewhat familiar, reflectively analyzing how 
it is encountered, and then expressing a richer 
comprehension of the thing in question. For example, 
one might begin with how the encountering of things 
includes the components of believing, valuing and 
willing, and then go on to distinguish the modalities 
of positive, negative and neutral in each of them. 
Then, again, one can describe how there can be 
intrinsic/extrinsic differences in things-as-posited in 
the three ways, a distinction that is probably most 
familiar in the relation of ends and means.  
 
Finally, phenomenological descriptions are most 
effective if related to carefully chosen examples, 
which I have attempted to do with the watching of the 
amusing puppy walk by in the park. 
 
(3) My claim that phenomenology is culture 
appreciative will be novel for some readers of this 
exposition, but most phenomenologists know that the 
Lebenswelt, which is the foundation of science and 
philosophy, is originally and concretely social and 
cultural. Ignorance of this may ultimately be due to 
the naturalism in Western thought that goes back to 
pre-Socratic philosophy, because naturalism tends to 
exclude the values and uses of things along with 
alleged supernatural causes. But, just as there always 
are believing, valuing and willing in mental life 
concretely considered, there are always also belief 
characteristics, values and uses to the things that are 
concretely encountered. And this is so even if such 
characteristics are either overlooked or deliberately 
disregarded. 
 
When the mentioned characteristics of things-as-
encountered are not only learned but also shared in 
groups, they are most appropriately called “basic 
cultural characteristics”. Most technical terms in the 
cultural disciplines, for example sociology or nursing, 
6 
This volume page number is not for bibliographic reference purposes
such as “mother” or “patient”, include reference to 
cultural characteristics – that is, values and uses – in 
their adequate definitions. And better recognized than 
this “basic culture” that is always already there, is the 
additional culture of common-sense interpretation in 
terms of ideal types that Alfred Schutz emphasized, 
so that there are then two especially important types 
of culture. In addition, the so-called “high culture” of 
fine art and classical music and the “popular culture” 
of fashion and advertising need also to be recognized. 
Under the influence of naturalism, the cultural can be 
overlooked or disregarded, but it is always already 
there and needs to be recognized for theoretical and 
practical purposes in phenomenology. Can there be a 
mother without value, and is a patient’s health not 
that to which care is a means?  
 
Reflection, description and culture appreciation are 
the three generic properties of the phenomenological 
approach in general, after which this approach can be 
specified by the discipline, given that, as already 
suggested, phenomenology is typically encountered in 
disciplinary forms. 
 
What Is Disciplinarity? 
 
“Disciplinarity” is the distinctive property that the 
groups called disciplines and also their members 
have. The likely reader of this presentation might be 
said then to be, in an odd usage, “disciplined”, but, in 
order to avoid the connotation of children being 
punished, the ugly neologism “disciplinizing” and 
derivatives will be used here. This seems best 
clarified beginning with a crude description of how 
individual disciplinarity is developed, with a more 
refined analysis attempted thereafter. 
 
Humans are born into pre-existing societies and 
acquire culture from those around them as they grow 
up. By going to school they become somewhat 
educated. As college undergraduates they begin to be 
disciplinized in the disciplines that they major in, and 
this can be continued more intensively in subsequent 
graduate or professional schooling. What they learn is 
a field-specific jargon – “deducible”, for example, 
being probably less used in history than in 
philosophy. One also learns what counts and does not 
count as a theoretical or practical problem in the 
particular disciplinary perspective. Then, again, there 
are the types of texts that one ought to try to write and 
publish, and there are the best outlets through which 
to do so, and the same goes for speaking at 
professional societies. Most disciplines have their 
own distinctive citation forms by which outsiders can 
recognize authors as different and by which insiders 
can recognize one another. Furthermore, there is an 
ever-changing hierarchy of institutions in each 
discipline at which to study and work that the 
disciplinized member needs to keep up with. 
Another thing members of disciplines learn about is 
founding figures and texts. They do not always know 
these well, but they are expected to express at least 
conventional interpretations when necessary. Even 
outsiders can connect disciplines and even famous 
books with figures such as Adam Smith, Charles 
Darwin, Emil Durkheim, David Hume, John Maynard 
Keynes and Niccolò Machiavelli. Disciplines also 
typically have conventional histories, which are often 
rather simplistic and mythological. 
 
Within disciplines there are, furthermore, specialties, 
such as theory of logic, which some seem to think is 
the whole of philosophy, and then there are schools of 
thought, such as Straussianism in political science, 
which members within a discipline may either support 
and belong to or oppose. Marxism, phenomenology 
and positivism are schools of thought found opposed 
to one another in many cultural-scientific disciplines. 
Even within the various schools of thought there are 
professionally more and less powerful positions that 
one learns to be aware of. Finally, there is variation 
within disciplines due to nationality and language that 
the disciplinized professional needs to know 
something about. French phenomenology, for 
instance, is different from German. 
 
A colleague once challenged my interest, following 
Alfred Schutz, in disciplinary definitions on the 
ground that I was fostering orthodoxy. To the degree 
that I succeed in calling attention to disciplinarity, 
however, I hope to get orthodoxy, which is usually 
subtle and implicit, to be explicitly confronted. 
Possibly the biggest problem with unexposed 
orthodoxy is that excessive narrowness works against 
learning from convergent research in other 
disciplines. Good fences make good neighbours only 
if they are not so high that one cannot look and talk 
over them.  
 
Let me now attempt reflectively to analyze the thing, 
disciplinarity, that has just been crudely described, 
and to do so let me look for the components of 
experience, belief, valuation, but still try not to get 
too technical in my descriptions. I begin with the 
probably typical high-school student’s perspective. 
Such a student regularly recognizes who is an English 
teacher, a Chemistry teacher, and so on, and it is not 
unusual for one teacher to teach several subjects. 
Thus I learned geometry with great pleasure and 
insight from a gym teacher who was best known 
around my high school as the basketball coach. If 
such high-school teachers consider themselves 
members of disciplines, it seems unlikely that their 
disciplinarity will be recognized in the descriptions of 
them by students. I did not think of my geometry 
teacher as a mathematician, and it never occurred to 
me that any of my teachers engaged in research, were 
awarded grants, published, or went to conferences. 
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In college this typically begins to change. Teachers 
are in disciplinarily identified departments, such as 
sociology, and are then believed by themselves and 
fellow sociologists, as well as by members of other 
disciplinarily identified departments, to be 
sociologists. This is something students learn from 
early on and begin to appreciate more deeply, 
especially if they become majors, and this is so even 
if the teachers are still called “professors” when they 
have forgotten that they need to conduct research so 
that they have original or at least well-founded 
opinions to profess. And the college student not only 
begins to learn discipline-specific terminologies and 
titles, but also learns to believe in the sources of her 
professors’ “professions”, with these encompassing 
not only where the professors studied, but also their 
various subsequent experiences, including research 
projects and special workshops. 
 
Besides learning both generally academic and 
disciplinarily specific language and coming to believe 
many things that are important in a discipline, the 
student comes to value and will with respect to 
disciplines encountered in college, indirectly as well 
as directly. Disciplinarity is directly encountered 
when the undergraduate student takes a class in a 
discipline, but before that the decision about whether 
to take a class is influenced by what friends as well as 
advisors say, among other things. One can dislike, for 
instance, economics, on the basis of what one hears 
about it. In that case, one decides not to take a course 
and does not begin to become disciplinized in that 
discipline. Phenomenologically speaking, economics 
thus acquires negative value and negative use for the 
student in question. Clearly this is irrational to some 
degree, but it does seem how things happen 
 
The contrary can occur, however. The student accepts 
advice about trying a course in a discipline, enjoys it, 
her positive valuing is then intensified, she takes 
additional courses, and eventually she decides to 
become, for instance, an economics major, no doubt 
in part because she has also come to believe that there 
are opportunities for employment that she would 
enjoy and for which a degree in the discipline would 
qualify her. The positive valuing is intensified, and 
positive willing of outcomes from the acquisition of 
disciplinary preparation is motivated by that valuing. 
The student can, however, be subject to disapproval 
and worse by her peers as well as by her professors – 
for example, if a student in a positivistic school of 
thought within a social science were to disparage 
mathematization, it would be unconscionable, and 
even to mention the existence of interpretive and 
qualitative approaches might not be tolerated.  
 
This process of social approval and disapproval can 
lead to and then continue with more intensity in 
graduate school, where the sense of belonging to a 
disciplinary in-group grows stronger along with how 
often stereotypical belief, valuing and willing 
attitudes toward other disciplines are encouraged – for 
example, how sociology is superior to all the other 
social sciences, not to speak of naturalistic scientists 
who scoff at the notion that social sciences are 
anything more than social studies disciplines that 
develop stories and not genuine knowledge. As 
previously mentioned, members of disciplines tend 
also to join various tendencies and schools of thought 
within them; these can be competitive and even 
antagonistic, but within them there is again mutual 
approval and assistance against the background of 
discipline-wide mutual approval and assistance. 
Tendencies, schools of thought and disciplines are 
continued only if their members work together. This 
even holds on the interdisciplinary level. 
 
These processes continue beyond graduate school into 
the professions. “Disciplinizing”, as it might be 
called, is a type of enculturation by which much that 
is specific about language, experiencing, believing, 
valuing and willing is learned, belongs to members of 
groups, and is thus cultural. It does not stop; as one 
advances in one’s career, however, one tends to 
become more active in disciplinizing others than in 
passively being disciplinized by them. Also, one can 
tend to become more conscious of disciplinarity and 
disciplinizing. Finally, it needs to be clearly 
recognized that disciplines are historical and change 
over time and that a good professional constantly 
seeks not to fall too far behind. 
 
What I have said is familiar to the likely reader of the 
present exposition, but if some aspects of my analysis 
of the disciplinarity that all professionals participate 
in throughout their careers are novel, then I will have 
made a contribution. Moreover, the emphasis on 
experiencing, believing, valuing and willing, and on 
things as-experienced, as-believed in, as-valued and 
as-willed, makes this sketch phenomenological in a 
rudimentary way that leaves it obvious that 
investigation can go deeper. In this respect I would be 
grateful for corrections and additions. 
 
Disciplines are good things inasmuch as research and 
improvements in practice benefit from being 
distinctly focused, with matters that are not relevant 
to the tasks at hand excluded, and this requires not 
only study and experience, but what amounts to 
indoctrination, as I have attempted to sketch above. 
But disciplinarity can be a bad thing. Being too 
narrow and focused to appreciate convergent thought 
in other disciplines has been alluded to above. 
Effective interdisciplinarity presupposes on all sides 
good preparation in the interacting disciplines and 
serious respect between them as well.  
 
Interestingly, disciplinized professionals tend to have 
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and enjoy what can be considered “superiority 
complexes”. Some sociologists believe in their heart 
of hearts that theirs is the master social science, while 
some historians can be sure that deeper understanding 
of how things have come to be and changed over time 
is the most important form of understanding; yet 
ethnologists question the objectivity of results from 
focusing on a single culture, while economists are 
convinced that they are the ones who investigate what 
is really fundamental, and so forth.  
 
Wise professionals are acquainted with the conceits of 
members of other disciplines as well as their own. 
Smart professionals do not express such high 
appreciations of their own disciplinarizations that 
they can be seen to manifest “disciplinary arrogance”. 
That is counter-productive in many ways, above all in 
its effect on interdisciplinary projects, but also in its 
impact on politics within academic and professional 
institutions. “Disciplinary modesty”, even if feigned – 
as modesty often is – is more effective, especially 
when one encounters how very strange the foreign 
cultures of other disciplines can be. And tolerance 
must always be cultivated if maximum inter-
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